Introduction: Killing the 'Cotton Canard' and getting rid of the 'Great Game'. Rewriting the Russian conquest of Central Asia, 1814 – 1895 by Morrison, Alexander Stephen
  
 
1 
 
Introduction: Killing the 'Cotton Canard' and getting rid of the 'Great Game'.  
Rewriting the Russian conquest of Central Asia, 1814 – 1895 
 
Alexander Morrison 
 
Nazarbayev University 
 
alexander.morrison@nu.edu.kz  
 
‘Они забыли дни тоски, 
Ночные возгласы: «К оружью», 
Унылые солончаки 
И поступь мерную верблюжью’ 
 
‘They have forgotten days of melancholy, 
Forgot the night-time call ‘To arms’! 
Forgot the dismal salty steppe 
And the camel’s measured tread.’ 
 
Nikolai Gumilev Turkestanskie Generaly (1911) 
 
 
Russia’s expansion southwards across the Kazakh steppe into the riverine oases of 
Turkestan was one of the nineteenth century’s most rapid and dramatic examples of imperial 
conquest. With its main phases sandwiched between the British annexation of the Indian 
subcontinent between 1757 and 1849, and the ‘Scramble for Africa’ initiated by the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1881-2, roughly contemporaneous with the French conquest of Algeria, 
it has never been granted the same degree of historical attention as any of these. In general, as 
Dominic Lieven has observed (2006 I, 3), studies of the foreign policy of the Russian empire are 
few and far between, and those which exist tend to take a rather grand, sweeping view of events 
rather than examining particular episodes in detail (Fuller 1998; LeDonne 1997 & 2004). Whilst 
there are both classic and recent explorations of the ‘Eastern Question’ and the Russian 
conquest of the Caucasus (Anderson 1966; Bitis 2006; Baddeley 1908; Gammer 1994), and 
detailed studies in English of Russian expansion in the Far East (Quested 1968; Bassin 1999; 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye 2001), the principal phases of the Russian conquest of Central 
Asia remain neglected and misunderstood. The only works in western languages which examine 
the conquest from a Russian perspective are brief and chronologically limited, and make little or 
no use of archival material.1 There is no equivalent of the studies that exist of British and 
French conquests and annexations in Africa or British expansion in India (Robinson & 
Gallagher 1965; Kanya-Forstner 1969; Fisher 1997; Cooper 2003; Brower 2009), or of recent 
scholarship on the Qing conquest of the neighbouring regions of Inner Asia in the eighteenth 
century (Perdue 2005). The closest equivalent to an economic analysis as comprehensive as Cain 
& Hopkins’s ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism’ thesis for the British Empire is the pioneering work of 
  
 
Dietrich Geyer, but unlike the former, which has sparked two decades of intense debate and 
revision amongst historians of the British empire, Geyer’s arguments have produced little in the 
way of engagement or response (Geyer 1977/1987; Cain & Hopkins 1990; Darwin 1997). If 
there is no comprehensive account of the conquest of Central Asia in English, the situation with 
Russian-language work is only slightly better. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union much 
modern Russian writing on the history of the conquest has regressed into unapologetic 
jingoism, with no fewer than four hagiographies of the brutal General Mikhail Dmitrievich 
Skobelev having appeared since 2000, together with celebrations of Russian victories in the 
region which are often indistinguishable from the triumphalism of the Tsarist period 
(Glushchenko 2001, 2010). There are some exceptions to this pattern – O. V. Boronin’s chapter 
on the Russian conquest in a recent collectively-authored work eschews Soviet-era shibboleths 
of ‘prisoedinenie’ (‘uniting’), although N. A. Bekmakhanova’s contribution to the same publication 
inexplicably persists with this term to describe the Russian conquest of the Kazakh steppe 
(Abashin, Arapov & Bekmakhanova 2008, 31-85). A. V. Postnikov’s study of Anglo-Russian 
rivalry on the Pamirs is a serious work of scholarship (Postnikov 2001), and Evgeny Sergeev’s 
recent study of Anglo-Russian diplomacy is also a deeply-researched book, although the 
framework limits and distorts his viewpoint (Sergeev 2012; Morrison 2013). In Central Asia 
itself much post-independence historiography is fiercely nationalist, presenting the conquest as 
warfare divided along straightforwardly ethnic and religious lines, ignoring and over-simplifying 
the complex web of alliance and conflict which existed between Russia, the Kazakhs and the 
Central Asian khanates (Abdirov 2000; Bababekov 2006). The chief exceptions are found in 
Kazakhstan, where scholars have begun to produce sophisticated work which acknowledges 
that many Kazakhs were allied to and fought for Russia, even as others opposed the advance.2 
In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, for political reasons, the outlook is bleaker, but some scholars 
(mostly in Oriental Studies rather than history) are producing outstanding work based on 
Islamic chronicles, poetry and other accounts in Persian and Turkic, which contain some 
material on the conquest (Erkinov 2004; Babadzhanov 2010; Pirumshoev 2010, 64-177). 
The history of the Russian conquest of Central Asia is also cursed with a dominant 
narrative that refuses to go away. Works on the so-called ‘Great Game’ between Britain and 
Russia in Central Asia abound, but these invariably examine the conquest as part of the wider 
geopolitical competition between the two powers, or as a series of anecdotes of adventure and 
derring-do by British (and occasionally Russian) soldiers and explorers.3 Central Asian rulers, 
states and peoples are marginalised or ignored completely in this narrative, which (consciously 
or unconsciously) reproduces the 19th-century European assumption that they were savage, 
backward, barbarous, and unamenable to any form of diplomacy or negotiation.4 Ian Campbell’s 
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paper demonstrates that British and Russian ‘players’ of the ‘Great Game’ had shared 
assumptions about the inferiority and exoticism of ‘Asiatics’, and the benefits of Europe’s 
civilising mission. Where the ‘Game’ was played at all, it was as much in a spirit of cooperation 
as of competition, as travellers, envoys and spies on both sides recognised the same imperial 
spirit in their opposite numbers.  
The ‘Great Game’ will doubtless continue to fascinate British historians, but its glamour 
always exceeded its practical importance, and its long-term consequences even for the security 
of British India turned out to be fairly negligible.5 For Russia herself the rivalry with Britain was 
important primarily in ideological terms: Britain was the leading ‘Great Power’ against which she 
measured her own imperial and diplomatic achievements, and whose global reach and clout she 
sought to emulate. As David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye’s paper shows, it was this 
resentment of and desire to ‘get even’ with Britain, rather than any rational calculation of 
strategic advantage, which led to the one authorised attempt by the Russians to invade India, 
Paul I’s despatch of 20,000 Cossacks in 1801. Significantly enough this was launched by a Tsar 
of doubtful sanity, and it was fortunate for the Cossacks sent on this hare-brained enterprise 
that they were halted near Saratov, before they had penetrated the steppes of Emba and the 
Ust-Yurt plateau, which would prove the doom of V. A. Perovskii’s expedition to Khiva forty 
years later. In practical, strategic terms though, attempts to play on British fears of Russian 
expansion towards India, and Russia’s own fear of British expansion in Central Asia only really 
came to prominence at the time of the First and Second Afghan Wars (Zagorodnikova 2005; 
Morrison 2014). Otherwise it is remarkable how seldom British India featured in the 
calculations of the Russian soldiers and statesmen who planned and undertook the conquest of 
Central Asia. Any study of this period requires a more profound understanding of Russian 
intentions, motivations and actions than is possible when viewing them through the lens of ‘The 
Defence of India’. After all, the fundamental fact about the ‘Great Game’, if this is understood 
as some sort of contest for the control of Central Asia, is that British influence in the region was 
negligible. Accordingly the energetic explorers and paranoid proconsuls of British India need to 
be pushed back to the margins of the story, where they belong. 
The importance of the conquest of Central Asia for the course of Russian history did 
not lie in any overwhelming strategic or economic benefits, but because it presented the empire 
with a vast, alien and almost exclusively Muslim territory, which unlike earlier Asian conquests 
in Siberia, turned out to be permanently unassimilable to the Russian ‘core’. More so even than 
the Caucasus, Central Asia would remain outside the main civic structures of the empire, and its 
very difference encouraged Russian statesmen to think of it as a colony analogous to French 
North Africa and British India, to be exploited accordingly (Sunderland 2010; Morrison 2012). 
  
 
In the Soviet period this creeping ‘colonialisation’ of the Empire’s Asiatic territories would be 
replaced by an extraordinary experiment in nation-building, in which Central Asia once again 
represented the greatest challenge because of its perceived ‘backwardness’ and distance from 
European civilisational norms (Martin 2001; Edgar 2004; Hirsch 2005; Bergne 2007). Both 
Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union would have been very different states without their Central 
Asian territories. 
Regardless of its significance for Britain or for Russia, the conquest of Central Asia is 
something that deserves to be studied in its own right, not as an incidental outcome of Anglo-
Russian rivalry. Its real significance is to be found in Central Asia itself, where its legacy was 130 
years of Russian and Soviet rule, and an unequal political and cultural relationship which 
continues to this day: the consequences of the Russian conquest for those lands and peoples 
which were thus incorporated in the Russian Empire ought to be at the heart of any 
interpretation of this period. For this historians need to make more extensive use of Central 
Asian sources on the conquest and its aftermath, and these are more abundant than many 
realise.6 Khivan, Khoqandi and Bukharan writing on the Russian conquest is rich, albeit 
somewhat unbalanced, but text editions of the chronicles are still few and far between, and most 
are still only available in manuscript: recent studies based on this material have transformed our 
understanding of Central Asia during the supposedly ‘stagnant’ 18th and 19th centuries (von 
Kügelgen 2002/2004; Holzwarth 2005 & 2006; Bregel 2004/2012; Levi 2007 & 2012; Sela 2011; 
Wilde 2012; Wennberg 2013). In particular Timur Beisembiev has devoted a lifetime of research 
to studying the contents, composition, authorship and language of the largest group of 
chronicles, those from nineteenth-century Khoqand (Beisembiev 2008 & 2009). His monograph 
on Mullah Niyaz Muhammad Khoqandi’s Ta’rikh-i Shahrukhi (1871) has now been joined by a 
text edition and translation of Mullah Muhammad Yunus Jan Shighavul Dadkhwah Tashkandi’s 
Ta’rikh-i ‘Aliquli, Amir-i Lashkar (1903): both these chronicles contain vivid accounts of the 
Russian conquest (Pantusov 1885; Beisembiev 1987, 2003). Another outstanding example of 
recent scholarship is Bakhtiyar Babajanov’s use of the eyewitness account of the final Russian 
invasion of Ferghana in 1875-6 from Ishaq Khan ‘Ibrat’s Ta’rikh-i Farghana (1915) 
(Babadzhanov 2010, 281-296). Ron Sela has demonstrated that the account of the conquest of 
Khiva in Muhammad Yusuf Bek Bayani’s Shajara-yi Khwarazmshahi (1914) is partly based on an 
Ottoman translation of the American journalist J. A. Macgahan’s description of the massacre of 
the Yomud Turkmen (Sela 2006). Four of the best-known Bukharan histories containing 
descriptions of the Russian campaigns against the emirate in the 1860s – Ahmad Donish’s Risala 
ya Mukhtasari az Ta’rikh-i Saltanat-i Khanadan-i Manghitiyya (1878), Mirza ‘Abd al-‘Azim Sami’s 
Tuhfa-i Shahi (1901) & Ta’rikh-i Salatin-i Manghitiyya (ca.1906-7) and Mirza Muhammad Salim 
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Bek’s Ta’rikh-i Salimi (1920) - are available in published editions, and have been used extensively 
by Azim Malikov in his article in this issue (Mirzoev 1960, Epifanova 1962; Norkulov 2009; 
Jalali 2010).7  
It is true that, as Sergei Abashin demonstrates in his analysis of the Ta’rikh-i Jadidah-yi 
Tashkand (the longest of all the Khoqandi chronicles, composed ca.1866 – 1882), these materials 
often give only a very limited sense of the local reaction to the Russian invasion: they are by and 
large the product of an elite literary tradition, and most of them were written with the benefit of 
a great deal of hindsight. Most Central Asian chronicles are concerned with either praising or 
damning particular dynasties or lineages, and far more concerned with the internal politics of 
the khanates than with the looming threat from Russia, even in the mid-19th century (though 
this in itself is an extremely important point). Nevertheless, even for those (like myself) who are 
restricted to using the few that have been published, they offer invaluable insights into the high 
politics of the sedentary states of Central Asia and the mentality of their ruling elites, and a 
powerful narrative counterpoint to the military memoir literature which dominates accounts of 
the Russian conquest. Local documentary (as opposed to narrative) evidence on the conquest is 
rarer, but can still be found in Central Asian archives, usually in the form of appeals from the 
rulers of Khiva and Khoqand to neighbouring nomadic peoples to resist the Russian advance.8 
There is also a legacy of poetry, folklore and oral history relating to the Russian conquest among 
the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen which, while it was usually only written down much later, 
also has much to offer (Babataiuli 2013, 28-30; Prior 2013, 335). 
One central question that remains unanswered in the existing historiography is simply 
this: why did the Russians conquer Central Asia? It brought them a long Asian frontier that 
proved as difficult and expensive to defend as India was for the British, but without the same 
economic and military advantages which the control of the subcontinent conferred.9 The ‘Great 
Game’ perspective – that it was designed either as a real or imaginary threat to India – may be 
part of the story, (that consideration was occasionally put forward when official battles had to 
be won in St Petersburg),10 but still tells us more about how the British perceived it than it does 
either about Russian intentions or local interpretations of the conquest. The historiography in 
Russian provides alternatives to this perspective, but is not without its own problems. The 
officers who took part in the conquest of Central Asia began writing its history even as the 
military campaign was still unwinding, a predictably triumphalist narrative which they exploited 
to good effect to climb the military hierarchies of the empire. This culminated in the 
appointment as War Minister from 1898 - 1904 of that quintessential Turkestanskii General, 
Alexei Kuropatkin, a participant in the campaigns in the Zarafshan and Ferghana valleys and the 
conquest of Transcaspia, himself the author of one of the more important histories of the 
  
 
conquest (Marshall 2006, 44-5; Kuropatkin 1899). It is no surprise that it was under his 
patronage that the historiography of the conquest took on canonical form, as he used state 
funds to sponsor the publication of M. A. Terent’ev’s official history, and A. G. Serebrennikov’s 
monumental, incomplete publication of documents relating to the conquest (Terent’ev 1906; 
Serebrennikov 1908 – 1915; Bartol’d 1973 IX, 558-9; Mirzaeva 1963).11 Taken together with the 
vast literature of campaign memoirs (Levteeva 1986), these works are rich in detail and remain 
vital and under-used sources, but their accounts have little explanatory power. The starting-
point of the Tsarist narrative was General Perovskii’s disastrous winter expedition to Khiva in 
1839, as the lessons learnt from this initial debacle were applied to a conquest which, as 
Serebrennikov put it ‘offers a shining example of how, with negligible resources it is possible to 
attain great results’ (Serebrennikov 1908 I, i). The various shifts, turns, catastrophic mistakes 
and dead ends of Russian policy in Central Asia were thus retrospectively smoothed out into a 
coherent strategy, which led to the creation of a new frontier in the steppe, based on a line of 
forts along the Syr-Darya and another along the Tian-shan range on the Chinese border, the 
uniting of these two lines and the fall of Tashkent in 1865. Military success and heroic sieges 
and skirmishes were presented as ends in themselves. In so far as the question of motivation 
was addressed at all, it was given either as the need to contain British ambitions in the region, or 
to punish the insolence of Central Asian rulers.  
Soviet historiography had a neat and predictable motive for the conquest (or ‘uniting’ – 
prisoedinenie – as it was officially known from the 1940s):12 as Lenin had written, the annexation 
of Turkestan was carried out at the behest of big capitalists, specifically the textile manufacturers 
of Moscow, panicked by the cotton drought of the 1860s caused by the American Civil War and 
desirous of obtaining both a secure domestic supply of raw materials and a captive market for 
shoddy Russian industrial goods (Khalfin 1960 & 1965; Kastel’skaia 1980). The Moscow textile 
‘barons’ thus played the same Machiavellian role in provoking the conquest of Central Asia as J. 
A. Hobson’s Jewish financiers in South Africa did in engineering the Boer War, an argument 
which fitted snugly into official Marxism-Leninism, unsurprising given Lenin’s considerable 
debt to Hobson (Eckstein 1991, 306-7). Historians who rely on Soviet-era literature still 
frequently give primacy to economic motives for the conquest of Turkestan in the 1860s, with 
the chief role being played by cotton hunger (Buttino 2007, 18; Beckert 2004; Bregel 2009, 405-
11; Dempsey 2010, 2-3, 36-8). However, this cannot have provided the spur for a conquest 
which began in earnest in 1853 with the siege of the Khoqandi fortress of Aq Masjid, and which 
would probably have come to an end much sooner had the Crimean War not intervened: for 
this and other reasons some historians had already rejected it over fifty years ago, and it is high 
time this Soviet-era canard was laid to rest (Whitman 1956, Becker 1968). As I explain in my 
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own paper, the notion that Russia’s fledgling industrial capitalists were somehow pulling the 
strings of Russian foreign policy behind the scenes in the 1860s is inherently implausible, and no 
solid evidence has ever been found to corroborate it.  
The only alternative to the dominant ‘Great Game’ and ‘Cotton Canard’ interpretations 
of the conquest in existing western historiography is that of accident, disobedience and 
aggression by ‘men on the spot’, a form of the ‘imperialism as atavism’ advanced by Joseph 
Schumpeter as a key motive for imperial expansion in conservative, aristocratic societies 
(Schumpeter 1951, 65-98). It could also be seen as something akin to the ‘prancing proconsuls’ 
who, according to some accounts, were instrumental in bringing about the British annexation of 
Egypt in 1882-3 (Schölch 1976). The key event in this interpretation is the fall of Tashkent, 
which has frequently been seen as an episode of disobedience and deceit by Russia’s ‘man on 
the spot’, General M. G. Cherniaev, in defiance of St Petersburg’s orders (Mackenzie 1969). As 
my paper explains, Cherniaev’s disobedience, if any, was minor – the Governors of Orenburg 
had been advocating Tashkent’s annexation since the late 1850s, tacitly supported by the War 
Ministry. Instead, the real questions were whether, and on what terms, the Russian presence in 
Tashkent would become permanent, and whether or not the advance would continue thereafter. 
The excessive focus on the fall of Tashkent has also tended to obscure earlier and later 
phases of the Russian advance, which were at once more crucial and more baffling.13 One 
question is why, when their steppe frontier had remained relatively stable for a hundred years, 
the Russians began a renewed advance into Central Asia in the 1840s. On the eastern frontier 
with China, Russian settlement along the Siberian line of fortresses through Ayaguz, Zaisan, 
Lepsinsk, Kapal and Vernoe in the relatively gentle climate of Semirechie was quite successful. 
From Orenburg in the West, however, the construction of Fort Raim near the Aral Sea in 1847, 
and the capture of the Khoqandi fortress of Aq Masjid in 1853 led to a doomed attempt to 
build a stable frontier with a line of fortresses along the Syr Darya, in the heart of some of the 
most barren territory of the steppe, a trap from which, by the early 1860s, the conquest of the 
fertile lands around Tashkent seemed the only way out. In neither case can this be attributed to 
‘men on the spot’ getting out of control: spontaneous advances on local initiative along the 
steppe frontier were impossible for the simple reason that every military expedition required 
months of planning to accumulate the necessary supplies and, above all, the necessary camels, 
without which even the most modern weaponry and well-drilled troops were completely useless. 
These had to be raised from the local Kazakh population (who also acted as drivers), and cost a 
great deal of money: Perovsky’s 1839 expedition to Khiva required over 10,000 camels, and the 
process of collecting them at Orenburg began 18 months before the expedition set off 
(Morrison 2014, 288-90).  Every stage of the Russian advance up to the fall of Tashkent was 
  
 
negotiated, vetted and costed down to the last kopek by St Petersburg, and did not proceed 
without the personal authorisation of the Tsar himself. What becomes clear is that almost 
everyone in the Russian military hierarchy up to and including the Tsar shared certain 
assumptions about the primacy of military over commercial or diplomatic interests, and 
considered that the first priority on the steppe frontier was upholding imperial prestige and 
claims to ‘sovereignty’, however these were defined. The ethos and culture of the military 
interest (‘paradomania’) permeated and controlled the very highest echelons of government 
during the reign of Nicholas I, and this persisted under Alexander II. Whilst the War Ministry 
was frequently opposed by the Ministries of Finance and Foreign affairs, this was almost always 
unsuccessful in the face of unwavering support from the Tsar (LeDonne 2004, 219, 227). 
The renewal of the Russian advance after the fall of Tashkent is also puzzling. By 1865 
the Russians had apparently succeeded in their main strategic aim in Central Asia, which was to 
create a new frontier running through a settled, grain-producing region. There were no plans for 
a further advance beyond Tashkent, and indeed they hoped that they would be able to turn the 
city into the centre of a puppet khanate, withdrawing most of their garrisons to the steppe 
fortresses. Had they succeeded then the political geography of Central Asia would have 
remained very different, with Russian rule limited to the steppe region, and Khoqand, Khiva 
and Bukhara surviving, like Afghanistan, as buffer states between Russian and British territory. 
Instead this strategy unravelled almost immediately, as war with Bukhara erupted in 1866, 
leading to the annexation of further territory and the creation of the Turkestan Governor-
Generalship, with the creation of a Russian protectorate over Bukhara. Territorial expansion 
continued throughout the 1870s as Khiva and Khoqand were swallowed up, the 1880s, with the 
conquest of Transcaspia, and the 1890s with the annexation of the Pamirs and the demarcation 
of the Russo-Afghan Boundary. There is no single explanation for any of these episodes. As 
Azim Malikov explains in his paper, Bukhara in part fell victim to its own intransigence in the 
face of a Russian threat which the emirate’s leaders underestimated, while the Russian advance 
produced chronic internal unrest and instability, but the campaigns of 1866, far more than those 
of 1864-5, do also reveal the importance of local, unauthorised initiative (made possible because 
the Russians were finally fighting in a settled region with adequate food supplies). Inomjon 
Mamadaliev’s micro-study of the siege of Khujand in 1866 further reinforces the point about 
the importance of local initiative by Russian officers during the three years after the capture of 
Tashkent, but also emphasises that the people of Khujand resisted the Russians out of local 
patriotism and a strong sense of urban identity, rather than through any loyalty to the Bukharan 
and Khoqandi states which had for so long contested the control of this strategic city, or indeed 
because of Islam. 
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The annexation of Khiva in 1873 had much to do with righting perceived slights and 
humiliations to Russian dignity in the past (the massacre of Bekovich-Cherkasskii’s force in 
1717, and Perovskii’s debacle in 1839), and with the desire of the new Governor-General, K. P. 
von Kaufman, for a set of newly-burnished laurels which he would not have to share with 
anyone else - although this campaign did have full authorisation from St Petersburg 
(Zaionchkovskii 1947 I, 88-90). Shioya Akifumi’s paper demonstrates that the military conquest 
of Khiva was followed by considerable interference in the internal affairs of the supposedly 
autonomous protectorate, as well as by Russian commercial and technological penetration, 
although the latter took a long time to manifest itself. His study of the construction of the New 
Lawzan Canal underlines the central importance of irrigation to Central Asian statecraft, and the 
long-delayed ability of the Russians to grasp this. It also shows that the key role played by the 
Yomud Turkmen in the internal affairs of the Khanate did not end with their massacre by 
Russian forces in 1873, as has often been assumed. 
 The rump of the Khanate of Khoqand was brought down in 1875-6 by internal strife 
and instability, in part fostered by the Russian presence, but also with deeper roots in the 
Khanate’s past. The subsequent Russian invasion of Ferghana is often treated as a mere 
afterthought in histories of the Russian conquest, but Sergei Abashin’s paper demonstrates 
clearly just how far Khoqand’s political fabric was rent by the Russian presence, and also the 
alarming brutality of the Russian campaign of ‘pacification’. For the ‘ulama who produced the 
narrative chronicles of the Khanate’s history it was a tragic final act, and one which definitively 
destroyed Khoqand’s place in the Dar al-Islam. At the most local level of all, however, in a single 
village, a traumatising defeat has been re-imagined and re-narrated as a triumph against the 
odds. 
As Robinson & Gallagher (1965) showed for Africa, peripheral instability, ambitious 
individuals, economic interests, and the destabilising influence of European power and trade can 
all play a role in triggering imperial expansion. Each time there may be a unique interplay of 
factors, but one constant always remains: the nature of the ‘official mind’ (or minds), either on 
the spot, or in the metropole, when confronted with the possibility or perceived desirability of 
expanding claims to sovereignty and the need to maintain ‘prestige’. Paul Kennedy argued thirty 
years ago that there is a certain remorseless logic to ‘Great Power’ status, the maintenance of 
which becomes an end in itself, requiring ever-greater military resources as competition 
increases, which in many cases eventually leads to growing economic weakness (Kennedy 1988). 
Beyond this, I would argue, that it also prompted states into annexations that often made little 
sense in either economic or strategic terms. This was partly because territorial size was also seen 
as a measure of power, but also because the very consciousness of ‘Great Power’ status brought 
  
 
about a sometimes neurotic obsession amongst ruling elites with the maintenance of ‘prestige’ in 
the face of challenges from weaker or more ‘backward’ states. As a ‘Great Power’, the default 
option for Russia (with one intriguing and revealing exception in Kulja)14 was always to advance 
and expand, and once a claim to sovereignty had been made, it had to be permanent. 
The final two papers, by Svetlana Gorshenina and Bakhtiyar Babajanov, remind us that 
the Russian conquest of Central Asia did not end with the military campaigns. We still 
understand too little about the economic relationship between Russia and Central Asia in the 
Tsarist period to be able to say anything definitive about it (though the evidence presented in 
Penati 2013 suggests that it was not always wholly exploitative). There is little doubt however 
that the military conquest of Central Asia was followed by a gradual and sustained process of 
cultural and ideological subordination. The Svetlana Gorshenina demonstrates how the Russians 
set about appropriating the architectural monuments of Samarkand as ‘cultural patrimony’ 
almost as soon as the city fell to them in 1868. K.P. von Kaufman was well aware of the city’s 
status as the capital of Timur, and sought to associate Russian rule with that earlier imperial 
legacy. The neglect of buildings such as the Gur-i Amir or Bibi-Khanym by the local population 
could be contrasted with Russian attempts to restore these monuments (almost always described 
as Timurid, regardless of who actually constructed them), and demonstrate that they took 
greater care of the legacy of the past. In the process, these buildings also became re-inscribed 
into a Russian narrative of conquest and subjugation. Bakhtiyar Babajanov’s intensive study of 
the writings (and rantings) of the prominent Orientalist-Administrator Nikolai Ostroumov 
reveal an uneasier side to Russian rule. Ostroumov was one of the chief ideologues of the 
Russian presence in Turkestan, a devout Orthodox Christian who proclaimed Russia’s civilizing 
mission in the region, whilst simultaneously acting as censor on local publications and editor of 
the only Turkic-language newspaper. He produced several pioneering works on the ethnography 
of the ‘Sarts’, and was a consultant on Islamic affairs to every Governor-General of Turkestan 
from the 1870s to the revolution. However his private papers reveal a much greater uncertainty 
about the permanence and stability of the Russian conquest. Ostroumov had an obsession, 
amounting almost to paranoia, that Russian civilization, and in particular Russian Orthodoxy, 
were under constant threat from cultural backsliding, ‘native’ insolence, and a failure to maintain 
Christian values in Turkestan. He focused much of his criticism on the second Governor-
General of Turkestan, Mikhail Grigor’evich Cherniaev, whom he considered to be lowering 
Russian prestige in the eyes of the local population. In the 1880s, twenty years after the fall of 
Tashkent, Ostroumov still considered the Russian presence in Central Asia to be deeply 
vulnerable. 
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The papers in this issue of Central Asian Survey offer a comprehensive reinterpretation of 
the Russian conquest of Central Asia – it was not a side-show of 19th-century Great Power 
competition, nor was it the inevitable outcome of the development of Russian industrial 
capitalism, nor was it accidental. Instead the different episodes of the conquest can only be 
understood through a series of microhistories, which foreground Russian motives and 
ideologies (contradictory and unclear as these often were) and, above all, the meaning and 
experience of the conquest for Central Asia and its peoples, who are still living with the 
consequences. 
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Notes 
                                            
1 These are Carrère d’Encausse 1967, a short essay which ignores the period before the fall of Tashkent; 
MacKenzie 1969 & 1974, which concentrate on the campaigns in which M. G. Cherniaev was involved, and 
Bauman 1993, which has a rather narrow focus on military tactics. By far the best accounts and interpretations 
currently available are in Becker 1968, 1-45 & Becker 1988, although he writes little about the period before 1865, 
and Palat 1988, which offers a sweeping, striking and often very perceptive interpretation of Russian expansion in 
the region, albeit without very substantial evidence to back it up. See also the brief overview in Abashin & 
Gorshenina 2009, 7-14. 
2 Strangely the new collectively-authored official history of Kazakhstan (Kozybaev 2010, III, 362-90) showcases 
both these tendencies; the account of the establishment of the Syr-Darya line by M. U. Shalekenov (362-8) is highly 
polemical, but the description of the conquest of Semirechie and the uniting of the two lines by I. V. Erofeeva 
(368-90) is a model of balanced, careful research. 
3 The classic popular account is Hopkirk 1990, but the most important scholarly study of the foreign policy of 
British India in Central Asia is Yapp 1980, whose level of detail and analysis has never been matched in the 
historiography of the Russian Empire. 
4 A recent attempt to apply International Relations theory to Central Asia in this period (Mackay 2013) compounds 
these prejudices with a total absence of primary research. For an excellent critique of the whole concept of the 
‘Great Game’ see Hopkins 2008, 34-47. 
5 Something acknowledged in Yapp 2001. 
6 Mackay (2013, 2) opens his article with the jaw-dropping statement that ‘Primary historical sources on Central 
Asia are limited’ – something true neither of Russian nor of Central Asian material for those who are actually 
prepared to do some research. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                      
7 For a discussion of Sami and his text, see Gross 1997. 
8 There are some interesting examples in the Kazakhstan state archives in Almaty, notably an appeal by Allah Quli 
Khan of Khiva to Turkmen and Kazakh Bahadurs and Biis to resist Perovskii’s expedition in 1839 (TsGARKaz F.4 
Op.1 D.2182 l.16ob), and a letter from the Khoqandi leader ‘Alimqul to a Kyrgyz Bii called Janata Atai Batur 
Dadkhwah in 1864 calling on him to resist the Russians (TsGARKaz F.3 Op.1 D.167 l.140). 
9 I have expanded on this argument more fully elsewhere (Morrison 2008); Alex Marshall suggests that fears for the 
security of the Empire’s Asiatic frontiers in the last years of the Tsarist regime distracted the ‘myopic guard’ of the 
Russian General Staff from the much more serious German threat (Marshall 2006, 176-193). 
10 For instance, it was used by War Minister D. A. Miliutin in 1863 to convince the more cautious Foreign Minister 
A. M. Gorchakov that the uniting of the Siberian and Syr-Darya lines of fortresses was absolutely necessary: 
Miliutin to A. M. Gorchakov 01/?/1863 RGVIA F.483 Op.1 D.62 ll.198ob-199ob 
11 ‘Min. Voen. Doklad po Glavnomu Shtabu. Kantseliariia Voenno-Uchenogo Komiteta’ 09/11/1901 RGVIA 
F.483 Op.1 D.150 l.2 The remaining volumes of Serebrennikov’s Sbornik (covering the period 1853 – 63 and 1866 
– 76) remained unpublished, despite pleas by V. V. Barthold, although the drafts are held in a special fond (I-715) 
in the Uzbek archives and have been used by Sergei Abashin for his paper in this volume. 
12 On the enforcement of this orthodoxy, which still finds many adherents in Russia today, see Tillett 1969 32-4, 
174-190; those historians who deviated from this line – notably Erumkhan Bekmakhanov (1947), were forced to 
recant. 
13 LeDonne, indeed, writes that the conquest of Central Asia began in 1864 (2004, 235) 
14 On the annexation and subsequent return of Kulja to China between 1871 and 1881 see Hsü 1965, Gorshenina 
2012, 95-132. 
 
Abbreviations 
RGVIA - Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv - Russian State Military 
Historical Archive 
TsGARKaz - Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan – Central State 
Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
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